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Once they got pass the hurdle, Kildall was cold to IBM’s insistence that Digital Research negotiate a flat licensing fee for CP/M and forgo Digital Research’s usual per unit royalty rate. It didn’t help matters that Kildall was generally disapproving of IBM because so many IBM products struck him as slow, unimaginative and clumsily designed.
But the biggest stumbling block preventing a deal was Kildall’s timing, or rather, his utter disregard for timing. IBM planned to build its personal computer around a new, faster Intel Chip called the 8086, but CP/M would need an upgrade in order to run on it.
Kildall already had such an upgrade in the works, called CP/M-86. But Kildall either wouldn’t guarantee to Sams that it would be delivered enough to meet IBM’s development deadlines.
Sams tried to explain that IBM needed a schedule and a commitment by October 1980, but Kildall resisted. Perhaps Kildall assumed that IBM would bend to his schedule, since it appeared that IBM needed him and CP/M’s 90% market share more than he needed IBM.
But what Sams gathered from Kildall’s attitude was that Kildall would never be a reliable partner and that the IBM PC project needed an alternative plan for an operating system.
Not long after, he stopped returning Kildall’s calls. Kildall’s fate was sealed forever as “the man who could have been Bill Gates.”
By giving up on Kildall and CP/M, Sams put himself in a tight spot. But Sams also knew that Gates, more than anyone, would be highly motivated to help him find a way out. During the time that Kildall was giving Sams a runaround over royalties and deadlines, Gates was back in Seattle bending over backward to accommodate IBM’s development schedule.
He had put almost Microsoft’s personnel to work on the IBM effort, shoving other projects to the side. Now Gates needed IBM PC project to succeed, if only out of a sense of survival of Microsoft.